United States changed its interpretation of the rules of the game: it has widened the scope of foreign policies that elicit offsetting duties, and it has increasingly used trade threats against one industry to extract trade concessions in another industry. Faced with such radical changes in established U.S. trade behavior, other countries may agree to negotiate on the new terms, or they may decide not to negotiate and instead may retaliate.
A simple game-theory payoff matrix in which two countries can choose to negotiate to open markets or retaliate and close markets will help in analyzing such a situation. For example, macroeconomic stress changes the political and economic benefits of pursuing an open markets trade policy, thus changing elements of the payoff matrix. If the United States increases the range of foreign policies that elicit offsetting penalties or penalizes one industry for infractions in another, it also changes the payoffs in the matrix. When the United States changes its established behavior by threatening to impose penalties, U.S. trading partners must decide whether to believe the threat. The effect is to reduce the confidence of the trading partner in the payoffs in the old matrix versus the payoffs in the new matrix. The magnitude of the change in the payoffs and the likelihood that these changes reflect a new strategy are both critical determinants of whether countries end up in a trade war with closed markets or decide to negotiate and open markets.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, I detail the features of the macroeconomic, political, and institutional landscape common to the Smoot-Hawley era and the present. That examination suggests a set of stylized facts about the political and economic gains or losses of following a particular trade policy strategy. I also describe the similarities and differences between the League of Nations and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for their codifying of the rules of the game and for their dispute-settlement procedures, and I suggest the extent to which these differences may contribute to a reduced likelihood of a trade war today.
Then I show how a set of simple game-theory payoff matrices can provide a framework for these stylized facts. The model suggests that retaliation was not a necessary result of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs, nor would it be a necessary consequence of U.S. protectionism today. The analysis further points out what factors may be important contributors to a negotiated outcome, instead of a round of retaliation.
Finally, I discuss incidents of retaliation for the Smoot-Hawley bill
and analyze some cases of protection and retaliation from the 1980s. This event analysis fits the hypotheses generated by the game-theory analysis.
Smoot-Hawley Era and the 1980s
In terms of severity, global reach, and depth of economic dislocation, there is little comparison between the macroeconomic problems of the 1930s and those of the 1980s. Nevertheless, relative to recent historical experience, the macroeconomic imbalances of the 1980s are severe, especially from the viewpoint of the United States. Moreover, most economists believe the proximate causes of the macroeconomic imbalances in both eras to be macroeconomic in nature. Yet, in both periods, policymakers turned to trade policy to provide at least a partial solution to the macroeconomic problems.
MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Between 1929 and 1931, price deflation and unemployment were the most severe problems confronting the nation. Agricultural prices fell 50 percent, while unemployment rose from 3.2 percent to 15.9 percent. Many economists argue that the cause of the Depression was monetary restraint combined with fiscal inaction. But at the time, the policymakers' solution to the problems of deflation and unemployment was to raise domestic prices and redirect demand towards domestic producers by increasing tariffs. For the Republican party, then in office, the tariff was the "household remedy." Moreover, as F. W. Taussig notes, "All the popular debates of the last generation . .. inculcated the belief that the mere imposing of a duty served at once to benefit the domestic pro- In the 1980s, the massive current account deficit in the United States is the key imbalance. Causes include the large U.S. fiscal budget deficit and a relatively low U.S. personal saving rate. The Gramm-RudmanHollings deficit reduction law attempts to target the macroeconomic imbalance at its source. But the omnibus trade bills currently under consideration in Congress focus on righting the trade imbalance through trade policy actions such as imposing surcharges on imports from trading partners that enjoy large bilateral credit balances and linking U.S. imports of certain countries' products to U.S. export performance in their domestic markets.
A second force behind use of the tariff in the 1930s was real exchange rate variability. Under the notion of the "scientific tariff," the appropriate tariff was the one that equalized the costs of production at home and abroad. As the Depression deepened, postwar gold parities broke down, and even Britain left the gold standard. In the ensuing "currency warfare ... tariffs became a very important weapon ... in meeting the competition of the European and overseas devaluation countries. " 3 In the 1980s real exchange rate variability has likely been one of the causes of increased trade complaints by U.S. industries. As the dollar appreciated, U.S. companies petitioned for emergency protection from import surges. Other companies charged foreign importers with pricing below cost of production or sales price in their home markets through the countervailing and antidumping (CV/AD) statutes. The CV/AD caseload more than doubled from 1980 to 1985. As the dollar depreciates, the number of CV/AD cases is rising as foreigners cut profit margins and prices on goods sold into the U.S. market in an effort to maintain their pp. 142-53. Johnson shows that two large countries with elastic offer curves will drive trade to zero if they both try to impose optimal tariffs. However, if one of the offer curves has an inelastic portion, trade will not go to zero. Kiyoshi Kuga, " Tariff Historically, Congress has presided over changes in tariff rates because of its constitutionally mandated power to levy taxes. However, over the decade before Smoot-Hawley, Congress delegated some of its tariff authority to the president. Believing that the pace of technological progress, and therefore the decline in foreign prices, was too quick for each specific tariff case to be submitted to legislative review, Congress passed the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 to give the president authority to adjust tariffs on specific commodities up or down as much as 50 percent. The president could raise (or lower) a tariff on a specific product to equalize the domestic and foreign costs of production as calculated by the nonpartisan Tariff Commission, the predecessor to the International Trade Commission. In fact, the president made only thirtyseven changes in specific tariffs, of which thirty-five were increases, between 1922 and 1930.4
As the economic dislocation of the Depression deepened and prices continued to fall, Congress reasserted its right over the specifics of tariff policy and produced the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. Initially a bill to increase agricultural tariffs, Smoot-Hawley could not have passed had the agricultural interests not formed a coalition with certain manufacturers.5 Eventually, the bill engendered 20,000 pages of testimony covering The World Economic Conference of 1927, attended by representatives from fifty nations, unanimously concluded that "the time has come to put a stop to the growth of customs tariffs and to reverse the direction of movement."8 As the business cycle turned in 1929, the Economic Committee of the League of Nations noted with great concern that "in spite of a few sporadic efforts no decisive movement has occurred in this direction.'" 9 It called for a two-year tariff truce. Thirty nations sent delegates with negotiating authority, and seven nations sent observers, to the March 1930 convention, which produced a draft agreement stating that signatories would not abrogate their existing commercial treaties for at least two years and would increase tariffs only in the case of an undefined domestic emergency. But the draft text was never put into effect. An escalating round of tariff increases was under way; nothing could stop it.
One of the factors that may help prevent escalating retaliation today is the GATT. The GATT articles, signed by nearly one hundred nations, with more still joining, are vaguely worded, cannot be enforced, and are critically uncomprehensive in both the range of trade issues addressed and solutions allowed. Nevertheless, simply by weight of numbers, GATT represents a consensus on what most believe should be the guiding principles of external policy. Protection must be nondiscriminatory and should be based on a price mechanism that is limited in time and scope; countries must compensate their trading partners if they invoke emergency protection; and GATT contracting parties agree to bring trade disputes to GATT, even if results of the committee deliberations cannot be enforced.
However, interpreting and implementing the principles are quite difficult, especially when doing so causes a nation's domestic and external policy objectives to conflict, as they do in the most contentious issues in the drafting of the agenda for the Uruguay Round-services trade, agricultural subsidies, and intellectual property rights.
To sidestep some of the principles and obligations of GATT, members turn to policies that are not within the spirit, although they are not 8. Liepmann, Tariff Levels, p. 348. 9. Ibid. explicitly outside the letter, of GATT. Market reservation schemes, nontariff barriers, and voluntary restraint agreements on exports are several examples. These policies are derogations from the GATT principles, and they weaken the established GATT consensus, maintaining which may be key to avoiding an escalating round of tariff retaliation.
Once Congress responds to mounting concern about trade by changing the conduct and implementation of U.S. trade policy and by deviating from the established international rules of the game, U.S. trading partners are necessarily confused about the future course of U.S. trade policy. They may not understand why the United States is now complaining about or even retaliating against policies that heretofore had been acceptable. Once the largest trading partner decides to play with a different set of rules, other countries can similarly reinterpret the rules to their advantage. The consequences of trading partners failing to agree on the rules are confusion, threats, and perhaps retaliation.
Game Theory and Trade Protection
A simple game-theory model will help show how a change in one country's attitude toward protection and a corresponding change in the perceptions of that country's trading partners that it has changed its trade policy strategy could lead either to negotiation that opens markets to trade or to retaliation that closes markets. '0 The model is only a simple presentation of the stylized facts using agame-theory paradigm. Virtually all the difficult aspects of the solution are saved for another paper, and I ignore the technical aspects of game theory that would stand in the way of this simple presentation. For any Q less than 0.5, the expected payoff to cooperating would be greater than 2 for each country if both chose negotiation and free trade (N). In this case, neither would be tempted to leave that outcome, for the R strategy promises a worse outcome whatever the other side might do in return. Thus this analysis suggests that uncertainty regarding payoffs is important in determining the outcome of trade negotiations.
Consider now the present-day situation. Instead of focusing on uncertainty regarding the payoffs, I will examine the effect of uncertainty facing U.S. trading partners with regard to the overall conduct of U.S. trade policy. Suppose the other country is Japan, and payoffs are shown below. The left-hand matrix displays payoffs before about 1985.14 Given the payoffs displayed in that matrix, the noncooperative equilibrium is in the southwest corner. An equilibrium in the southwest corner might result from a U. S. political utility function in which the moral imperative of maintaining a liberal trading environment exceeds any economic losses associated with Japan's strategy of closed markets. This result could come from a variety of different weights on moral benefits versus economic costs in the utility function. Where P equals 2/3, the expected value of the negotiation strategy equals the expected value of the retaliation strategy. If P is greater than 2/3, then Japan will keep the closed markets strategy, the United States will change to that strategy, and the retaliation-trade war equilibrium obtains. But, for any P less than 2/3, the expected value of the negotiation strategy is greater than the expected value of the retaliation strategy. Japan will choose the open markets strategy, and the United States will do likewise. The United States is better off than it was in the equilibrium strategy in the pre-1985 matrix, although Japan is not as well off. But both are better off than they would be under the retaliation-retaliation strategy in the post-1985 matrix. What can the United States do to get Japan to choose the negotiation strategy? It can increase Japan's conviction that the post-1985 matrix represents the true payoffs and strategies-that is, increase the threat of retaliation. Or it can increase the penalties of the retaliation-retaliation equilibrium, which will also raise the value of P required to make Japan choose the negotiation strategy. 15 The posturing in Congress, the threats of retaliation, the stricter application of trade laws, and the actual incidents of retaliation by the United States are ways of communicating changes in the values of the payoffs, thus informing trading partners that they should not look back at the old game, but forward to the new game.
As this simple example points out, it is not clear that the outcome for either or both countries is superior to that obtained before the United States changed its conduct, the outcome associated with the pre-1985 matrix. The UNN 
Retaliation
The model suggests that the retaliation equilibrium, in which both countries pursue a trade strategy that closes markets, is more likely when the losses due to that outcome are small or are weighted too lightly by the second country when it tries to determine whether the first country's trade strategy has changed. Both the historical record on retaliation after Smoot-Hawley and the trade disputes currently under way support this hypothesis.
SMOOT-HAWLEY PERIOD
Not all the tariff increases in Europe and Latin America during the 1930s can be attributed to the Smoot-Hawley tariff. As already noted, the League of Nations convened a conference to discuss tariff increases in Europe well before Smoot-Hawley was even in committee. Although distinguishing between retaliatory trade actions and ones that a country would have taken anyway is difficult, I will present three examples in which the timing and the specificity of the actions suggest retaliation. A key theme of these cases is that these countries retaliated because they felt that the U.S. tariff action against them was a violation of the established code of international behavior.
During the 1920s and 1930s, many politicians and economists felt that international flows of gold, as well as of credit, determined domestic and international growth and stability. When the price-specie flow mechanism works as it should, surplus countries gain gold supplies leading to increases in domestic wages and prices. Rising wages and prices in turn increase absorption and reduce competitiveness, yielding gold flows out of the country. If gold flows are restricted by limiting trade, deficit countries cannot achieve rising income, prices, and wages.
The Smoot-Hawley tariff undermined the workings of this mechanism by restricting U.S. imports when the United States was enjoying a balance of payments surplus.'6 Some U.S. politicians even hoped that Smoot-Hawley would return the country to autarchy. As other countries saw it, the United States was trying to reduce permanently the gold supply in circulation, yielding further declines in prices and activity in the deficit countries. Asher Isaacs reports that Italian editorials charged the United States with "attempting to corner the gold supply and ruin the entire world, especially Italy." 17 Another element of the established code of international trade conduct was that tariffs could be applied to protect domestic industry. But the Smoot-Hawley tariffs also hit innumerable products that the United States did not, or in some cases could not, produce. When countries sign the GATT, they agree to a standard of international behavior regarding emergency protection and offsetting penalties for certain domestic policies. Moreover, even when emergency protection is allowed and "fair," it must follow the GATT principles of transparency, nondiscrimination, and market orientation. Article XIX, the safeguard clause, outlines the emergency situations that allow temporary protection for specific industries and details the rules of compensation for imposing any protection. Articles VI and XVI, countervailing duty, antidumping, and export subsidy Hours before the tariffs were to take effect, the United States and the EC negotiated an agreement that allows U.S. grain exporters to compete with community producers for part of the Spanish market. In this case, it appears that the threat of prohibitive tariffs raised the economic stakes sufficiently to encourage a negotiation-open markets strategy. Also, imposing the tariffs, and then giving the EC an opportunity to negotiate them away, increased the perception that the United States was serious.
The U.S.-Japan semiconductor accord of July 1986 and the more recent imposition of tariffs on certain Japanese electronics is another interesting case. Following an affirmative finding of dumping of certain kinds of semiconductor chips, the United States and Japan negotiated an agreement designed first to reduce the flood of chips into the United States, second to increase the price of chips without differentially hurting U.S. users of chips, and third to enhance the position of U.S. chipmakers in Japanese markets. In order to meet the second objective, the U. S. did not want simply to apply dumping duties. Instead, the accord appears to come close in spirit to fixing the world price for certain kinds of chips.28 28. The Commerce Department, using Japanese production cost data, decides on a "fair" price for Japanese chips that includes an 8 percent profit. The Japanese government must then monitor its industries' compliance with this export price.
The Commerce Department has since charged the Japanese government with failing to monitor export prices, thus allowing chips to be dumped through third markets. The administration imposed 100 percent tariffs on $300 million of Japanese electronic products such as laptop computers, certain television sets, and power-driven hand tools. Coincidentally, some of the affected firms have U.S. competitors that have been trying to crack the Japanese market. The tariffs come at a time when Japanese producers are particularly vulnerable in the U. S. markets because of the yen appreciation; Korean and Taiwanese producers are ready to step in. Therefore, it appears that the Commerce Department's retaliation for the Japanese government's nonperformance on the chip agreement could impose some economic losses on Japan. Although the tariffs have been imposed, Commerce has said that they will be rescinded as soon as Japan can prove that it is not dumping chips into third markets. Thus, as in the luxury edibles case, there is an opportunity for the United States and Japan to reach the negotiated outcome. But this negotiated outcome might not have been possible had the United States not shown that it is serious about retaliation, which in turn raises the probability Japan puts on the losses associated with a trade war.
Various aspects of the semiconductor case have been brought to the GATT. The EC has filed a case arguing the illegality of the semiconductor accord. Even though the accord appears to be nondiscriminatory, it certainly does not meet the market test required of GATT-approved methods of protection. Moreover, Japan threatens to file in the GATT for compensatory damages, arguing that in fact it has met the terms of the agreement. If so, the U.S. tariffs may come under Article XIX, which allows the affected country to apply compensating tariffs.
Other examples of a change in U.S. policy stance can be found in Section 201 cases, in which Congress has loosened the requirements for obtaining an affirmative judgment of injury from the ITC. Changes include relaxing the requirements that imports be the most important cause of injury and that injury be measured primarily by changes in employment. Now, imports need be only one of several causes, and the ITC must measure injury much more broadly than simply by changes in employment. With the new legislation in place, the nonrubber footwear case turned from a no-injury decision in 1983 to a vote of injury in 1985. Under existing law, the president need not abide by the ITC recommendations, and in the footwear case, President Reagan vetoed any protec-tion. That presidential discretion is one loophole Congress is aiming to close.
In another example of how the United States is signaling its intention to play hardball in the trade policy game, the administration has begun to use Section 301, "unfair trade practices," as a threat to open export markets. If a country is found to be unfairly closing markets to U.S. exports, the president can retaliate against any product exported from that country. This rather broad mandate has led to agreements opening the Korean insurance market and the Japanese tobacco market, the latter of which involves removing a 26 percent tariff and restructuring the domestic tobacco monopoly. In two cases, one against Japanese rice producers and the other against Argentine soybean producers, the president has used the discretion with which he is currently empowered and refused to act. Again, Congress wants to eliminate that discretion. Moreover, the omnibus trade bills expand the definition of unfair trade practices to include such issues as workers' rights and targeting of traditional U.S. overseas markets.
An interesting problem involving these negotiated 301 settlements is cheating.29 In the Korean insurance case, for example, the initial settlement apparently opened the market. But U.S. companies were not initially allowed to participate in a compulsory financing pool, so a second case was threatened. In a Japanese telecommunications case, the United States charged the Japanese with unfairly limiting competition in the telecommunications market because Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) was a government entity. The Japanese government agreed to take NTT public, and it is now a public corporation, all of whose shares are owned by the government.
The Reagan administration is also using other existing legislation more extensively in the trade arena, applying Section 232 (national security) to products ranging from machine tools to frozen concentrated orange juice. Taiwan and Japan agreed to voluntary export restraints on machine tools, perhaps because they are used to having this kind of policy "negotiated," and after all, they do get the economic rents for their trouble. Switzerland and Germany did not agree to such restraints.
29. Cheating can be put into the game-theory paradigm by making payoffs a weighted average of the cheat and no-cheat values. However, the repeated game format is a necessity for this model to make sense. Because Swiss and German machine tools do not compete with U.S. products, the two countries argued that the U.S. threat was politically motivated, that voluntary restraints run counter to GATT rules, and that they would not be party to any such agreements. The president has threatened to slap quotas on their machine tools if their exports to the United States exceed a specified level.
Collectively these actions seem to signal a shift in U.S. trade policy. Even so, U.S. behavior is hard to predict. Moreover, the costs of retaliation are hard to quantify. In some of the specific cases noted above, threats of U.S. retaliation apparently led to negotiations to open markets. In others, it appears that tit-for-tat retaliation strategy is being pursued. Therefore, the United States cannot be sure that its threats of retaliation will lead to other countries choosing the open markets strategy.
For that reason the United States is engaged in both multilateral and bilateral negotiations to increase the economic gains from an open markets strategy and to increase the likelihood that other countries will pursue that strategy. The GATT Uruguay Round brings to the table many topics and many countries. On a smaller scale, the United States has negotiated a free trade agreement with Israel and is negotiating one with Canada. There is also mention of trade agreements with areas ranging from Mexico to the Southeast Asian nations. Together, these two negotiation techniques may be the best way to maximize the likelihood of the open markets strategy being pursued by all. 
Conclusions

